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Veriﬁcation of protocolsAbstract In recent times, many protocols have been proposed to provide security for mobile satel-
lite communication systems. Such protocols must be tested for their functional correctness before
they are used in practice. Many security protocols for the mobile satellite communication system
have been presented. This paper analyzes three of the most famous authentication protocols for
mobile satellite communication system from the security viewpoint of data desynchronization
attack. Based on strand spaces testing model, data desynchronization attacks on these protocols
were tested and analyzed. Furthermore, improvements to overcome the security vulnerabilities of
two protocols are mentioned.
 2014 Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of National Authority for Remote Sensing and
Space Sciences.1. Introduction
Nowadays, Mobile satellite communication systems have
become one of the most important technologies. Security is a
very important requirement in any system, especially in wire-
less communication systems. For a satellite user to communi-
cate with other users, he must be authenticated ﬁrst by the
remote server. This paper is concerned with the authentication
between mobile users and the remote server. Many mobile
satellite communication systems have been proposed in recent
years (Chang and Chang, 2005; Chen et al., 2009; Lasc et al.,
2011; Eun-Jun et al., 2011; Lee et al., 2012; Cruickshank, 1996;
Hwang et al., 2003). In the past, for more than 10 years the tra-
ditional satellite communication system that was used was thegeostationary satellite. The geostationary satellite is located in
geosynchronous equatorial orbit (GEO). Such a satellite
returns to the same position in the sky after each sidereal
day (Larson and Wertz, 1999). However, the quite far distance,
exactly 22,300 miles, between the geostationary satellite and
the earth resulted in a signal delay problem. Over the past
10 years, low-earth-orbit (LEO) satellite communication
systems are used for establishing personal communication sys-
tems as shown in Fig. 1. This is due to their large broadcasting
range and communication area, small attenuation of the sig-
nals and a shorter transmission delay (Chen et al., 2009). There
have been many researches on the authentication protocols for
the mobile satellite communication system. Some protocols are
based on public key cryptosystems like Cruickshank (1996)
which involves heavy computation costs. In 2003, Hwang
et al. (2003) proposed an authentication protocol using sym-
metric encryption to reduce the complexity of computations.
But both Cruichshank’s protocol and Hwang et al.’s protocol
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Chang and Chang (2005) proposed a new protocol to solve
the weakness found in previous protocols. They used the Dif-
ﬁe–Hellman key exchange (Difﬁe and Hellman, 1976). But
from our analysis in Section 3 we found that Change et al.’s
protocol (Chang and Chang, 2005) is susceptible to data
desynchronization attack. In 2009, Chen et al. (2009) proposed
a protocol based on discrete logarithm problem. It overcomes
the complexity of public key infrastructure, reduces the hard
computation from the mobile user and does not require sensi-
tive veriﬁcation table for the NCC. But this protocol is suscep-
tible to data desynchronization attack as will be declared in
Section 4.
In 2012, Lee et al. (2012) pointed out that Change et al.’s
protocol (Chang and Chang, 2005) lacked user anonymity
and impersonation attack. Lee et al. proposed a new protocol
that has low computation cost. He claimed that his protocol
avoids previous security ﬂaws. But this protocol is also suscep-
tible to data desynchronization attack as will be declared in
Section 5.
In our paper we presented an analysis for the three most
famous authentication protocols for mobile satellite communi-
cation systems (Chang and Chang, 2005; Chen et al., 2009; Lee
et al., 2012). We are concerned with the data desynchroniza-
tion attack in our analysis for these protocols. We chose this
type of attack for our analysis because this attack depends
on jamming which is considered the most dangerous enemy
in space communication. The notations in Table 1 are used
throughout this paper.
2. Deﬁnition of strand spaces model
A strand is a sequence of actions executed by a single principal
in a single local session of a protocol (Guttman, 2011). We
enrich strands to allow them to synchronize with the projection
of the joint state that is local to the principal P executing the
strand. The actions on a strand are deﬁned into: message trans-
missions, message receptions, and state synchronization
events. Strands are used for the protocol and communicationTable 1 Notations.
Notation Interpretation
U The mobile user
LEO Low earth orbit satellite
NCC Network Control Centre
Pn The penetrator
UID, LEOID User/LEO permanent identity
TIDu User temporary identity
sk Session key
MACk(.) Keyed one-way hash function using the key k
(m)k Symmetric key encryption function for a
message m using the key k
H(.) One-way hash function




x Long term private key
y Long term public key
L Large Prime numberbehavior (Guttman, 2011). A strand is a (linearly ordered)
sequence of nodes n1) . . . ) nj, each of which represents
either:
Transmission of some message msg(ni) = ti, graphically
 !ti ;
Reception of some message msg(ni) = ti, graphically !ti ;
A strand is a sequence of transmission and reception events
local to a particular run of a principal. If this principal is honest,
it is a regular strand. If it is dishonest, it is a penetrator strand
(Guttman and Javier Thayer Fabrega, 2001). A bundle C is a
causally well-founded collection of nodes and arrows of both
kinds. In a bundle, when a strand receives a message m, there
is a unique node transmitting m from which the message was
immediately received. By contrast, when a strand transmits a
message m, many strands (or none) may immediately receive
m. The height of a strand in a bundle is the number of nodes
on the strand that are in the bundle (Guttman and Javier
Thayer Fabrega, 2001). In the following sections an analysis
of the most three famous schemes for mobile satellite authenti-
cation protocols is presented. Suggestions are presented to
improve these schemes. We assume in the three presented pro-
tocols that the LEO satellite is always a trust node. During
the paper, transmission of messages from the NCC to the user
U means transmission from the NCC to the LEO, then trans-
mission from the LEO toU. Also the opposite is correct. Trans-
mission of messages from the user U to the NCC means
transmission from U to the LEO, then transmission from the
LEO to the NCC.
3. Data desynchronization attack on the CC protocol
3.1. The CC protocol
Chang and Chang proposed a mutual authentication mecha-
nism (Chang and Chang, 2005) hereafter referred to as the
CC protocol. In the CC protocol, the authentication between
the mobile user and the network control center (NCC) is
within a LEO satellite communication system. Mobile users
are interconnected directly through LEO satellite links, while
communication between satellites and the NCC is managed
by Gateways. The CC protocol is composed of three phases:
registration, authentication and mobile update.
3.1.1. The registration phase
In this phase, U has to register at the system. U is assigned a
permanent identity UID, the secret key K shared between U
and NCC, a temporary identity TIDu by the gateway, and the
number of times (N) that the mobile user can access the service
before an update phase is required.
3.1.2. The authentication phase
The authentication phase is performed by U and NCC before
any communication. Note that NCC stores (UID, TIDu, LEOID,
HN+1–(j1)(K||UID||TIDu), (N(j  1))) for U, and U keeps
(UID, TIDu, K, (N(j  1))) at this stage. The details are
described as follows:
Step 1: the LEO sends the authentication request to U.
Figure 1 A LEO communication system.
2:
Figure 2 Data desynchronization attack on CC protocol.
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computes H(P) ¯ R and P ¯ H(R), where P= HN(j1)
(K||UID||TIDu) and R is a one-time random number. Then
U sends the computation results and TIDu to LEO.
Step 3: Upon getting H(P) ¯ R, P ¯ H(R), TIDu, and
LEOID, NCC.
Step 4: after gettingH(P) ¯ R, P ¯ H(R), TIDu, and LEOID,
NCC uses TIDu to obtain the corresponding secret data
using the lookup table. The authentication process between
the NCC and U in this protocol is based on proving
possession of the current value of the authentication
token P. The NCC computes R0 = HN+1(j1)(K||UID||
TIDu) ¯ (H(P) ¯ R), P0 = H(R0) ¯ (P ¯ H(R)), H(P0). If
H(P0) = HN+1(j1)(K||UID||TIDu), NCC ﬁrst updates
UID, TIDu, LEOID, H
N+1(j1)(K||UID||TIDu), (N  j+ 1)
to (UID, TIDu, LEOID, P
0, (N  j)) and computes H(R0||P0).
Then NCC sends H(R0||P0), LEOID, TIDu and the grant
message to LEO. Otherwise, NCC terminates the protocol.
Step 5: After receiving the messages sent from NCC, LEO
forwards them to U.
Step 6: Upon getting H(R0||P0) and TIDu forwarded by
LEO, U checks whether H(R||P) is equal to H(R0||P0). If
it holds, U is convinced that NCC is legal and updates
UID, TIDu, K, (N(j  1))) to UID, TIDu, K, (N  j)).
3.1.3. The mobile update phase
In the Nth authentication, U and NCC enter the mobile update
phase. The NCC generates and issues a new session key K and
a new temporary identity TIDu for the user to be used for the
next N authentications.3.2. Data desynchronization attack on the CC protocol
In the authentication phase of the CC protocol, NCC and U
update their shared secret information shown in Fig. 2 as fol-
lows: the NCC updates its shared secret before sending mes-
sage 2. U updates its shared secret after receiving message 2.
If message 2 of the authentication phase of the protocol does
not reach the mobile user U because of the penetrator Pn for
example while the NCC has already updated the secret shared
data and U has not updated yet the NCC and U will operate at
different levels in the hash chain. Thus, they operate asynchro-
nously on the hash value that is used to authenticate each
other.
3.3. Improvement of the CC Protocol
For the above ﬂaw, the following improvements to the CC
protocol to resist data desynchronization attacks are presented
in Lasc et al. (2011). The mobile authentication phase is
174 R.A. Abouhogailchanged into two modes. The selection between the two modes
is according to whether there are legitimate authentication
requests (messages 1, 2a) or illegitimate authentication
requests (1, 2b) as shown in Fig. 3. After the mobile sends mes-
sage 1 as in Fig. 3 the NCC computes R0, P0, and H(P0). The
NCC then checks if H(P0) = HN+1(j1)(K|UID|TIDu). If the
check holds the NCC updates the corresponding entry in the
lookup table to (UID, TIDu, LEOID, P
0, (N  j)). In message
2a NCC sends TIDu, H(R
0||P0) to U by the LEO. U veriﬁes
the authenticity of NCC as before then if the NCC is authentic
U updates the stored data. On the other hand, if the NCC
receives an incorrect authentication request, it responds with
a resynchronization challenge (messages 1, 2b). The message
2b contains H(PNCC||TIDu), H(PNCC) ¯ RNCC; where PNCC is
NCC’s currently stored authentication token, RNCC is a newly
generated random number. Once receiving message 2b, the
mobile user compares the received PNCC with the remaining
P values in the chain. If a match is found the mobile user
advances to the resynchronization phase. If no match is found
the resynchronization request is considered illegitimate and the
same authentication request is re-sent.
4. Data desynchronization attack on the CLC protocol
4.1. The CLC protocol
Chen et al. proposed an authentication mechanism for mobile
satellite communication systems in Chen et al. (2009). The
CLC protocol is as follows:
4.1.1. The initialization phase
The NCC chooses a large prime L and a generator g of the
multiplicative group ZL
* with order q (q is a large prime factor
of L  1). The NCC selects a long-term private key x,
1 6 x < q; and the corresponding public-key is y= gx mod L.
4.1.2. The registration phase
NCC! U : UID;TIDu;Ks
The NCC assigns to each mobile user U a permanent
identity UID, an initial temporary identity TID, and selects a
random number K; 1 6 K < q, and computes:
r= gk mod L.
s= H(UID)x+ Kr
1 mod q, and generates the user secret
key Ks.
Ks =H(UID, K).
The NCC stores UID, TIDu, r, s into NCC’s veriﬁcation
table. The NCC stores UID, TIDu, Ks in user’s smart card.1. U-> NCC:
2. a. NCC->U: .
2. b. NCC-> U: | | .
Figure 3 Improvement of CC protocol.4.1.3. The authentication phase
During this phase, the two parties U and NCC use the shared
secrets established during the initialization and registration
phases to prove their identity to each other.
U! LEO : TIDu; c
U calculates the session key sk=H(Ks, TIDu); TIDu is
refreshed after one successful login, and calculates c=MAC
Ks (UID, TIDu, sk).
LEOﬁ NCC:TIDu, c, LEOID; the LEO appends its identity
LEOID upon receiving the authentication message.
NCC! LEO : ðTIDu;TIDunewÞsk;LEOID:
The NCC checks the identity of the LEO upon receiving the
authentication message and does the following operations:
a) Find the corresponding information {UID, r, s} associ-
ated with TID by looking up the veriﬁcation table.
b) Validates K using the equation s= h(UID)x+ Kr
1
mod q.
c) Computes the possible user secret key Ks
0 = h(UID, K),
and the possible session key sk0 = h(Ku, TIDu).
d) Compute c0 ¼ MACK 0sðUID; T IDu; sk0Þ, then check if
c0 = c. If they match the user is authenticated and the
session key is conﬁrmed otherwise the authentication
request is rejected.
e) Generate TIDnew and update the veriﬁcation table, then
return {(TIDu, TIDunew)sk, LEOID} to the LEO.
LEO! U : ðTIDu;TIDunewÞsk
Once the user receives the data, he can verify whether the
decrypted TIDu is identical to the stored TIDu. If they are iden-
tical, the mobile user U will authenticate the NCC and will
update its temporary identity to TIDunew for the next
authentication request. After authentication, the two parties
will encrypt their data with the session key sk. TIDunew will
be used for the next authentication request.
4.2. Data desynchronization attack on the CLC protocol
In (Chen et al., 2009), Chen et al. deemed that their proposed
authentication protocol could guarantee data conﬁdentiality,
mutual authentication, and user’s privacy. However, the
CLC protocol cannot offer any protection against data syn-
chronization attack: a penetrator Pn can easily force an honest
tag to fall out of synchronization with the reader so that it can
no longer authenticate itself successfully. The data desynchro-
nization attack on the CLC protocol can be described in Fig. 4.
In the data desynchronization attack, the penetrator Pn easily
destroys the synchronization of TIDu between the NCC and the
mobile user U. Pn can intercept the message (TIDu, TIDunew)sk
from NCC to U. Therefore, NCC will refresh the user tempo-
rary identity TIDu while the user U will not do it. Thus, the
shared temporary identity between U and NCC is not identi-
cal. After a successful data desynchronization attack, U and
NCC will share different secrets and U and NCC will not
authorize each other mutually. Thus, the availability of the






Figure 5 Improvement of CLC protocol.
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To solve the data desynchronization attack problem described
above, the NCC must keep the old temporary identity TIDu
from the last successful authentication. When U and NCC fail
to authenticate because of data desynchronization attack, it
will use the previous stored temporary identity TIDu as shown
in Fig. 5:
Two extra messages must be added to solve the problem of
data desynchronization attack for the CLC protocol. When
the user U does not receive any messages from the NCC
because of jamming, he will resend message No. 2 with a
new c, which is called c0 as shown in step 4 in Fig. 5. The
NCC must compare the received TIDU with the new one and
the previous one. If the received TIDU is equal to the last stored
one, the NCC will send message No. 3 again with the last
generated TIDnew to save time and computation overhead.
5. Data desynchronization attack on the Lee et al. protocol
5.1. The Lee et al. protocol
Lee et al. proposed an authentication scheme for satellite
communication systems (Lee et al., 2012). Their scheme
consists of three phases: Registration phase, Login phase,
and authentication phase.
5.1.1. The registration phase
The steps of registration are as follows:
Step R1. U) NCC:UID
Step R2. NCC) U:TIDu, R, k
P ¼ hðUIDjjxÞ
R ¼ P hðUIDjjkÞ
where k is a secret random number and x is a long-term private
key generated by the NCC. Then, the NCC creates the tempo-
rary identity TIDu and stores UID and TIDu in the veriﬁcation
table. After that, the NCC issues a smart card and sends it
to U. The smart card contents are: {TIDu, R, k, H()}.
5.1.2. Login phase
The steps of login phase are as follows:
Step L1. U inserts his smart card into a smart card reader
and inputs his identity UID.Pn
Figure 4 Data desynchronization attack on CLC protocol.Then the smart card chooses a secret random number r to
calculate
P0 ¼ R hðUIDjjkÞ
Q ¼ P0  r;S ¼ HðUIDjjrÞ
Step L2. Uﬁ NCC:Q, S, TID
Finally, U sends the login message {Q, S, TID} to the NCC.
5.1.3. Authentication phase
Step A1. After receiving the authentication request from U, the
NCC obtains UID according to TID and computes
P ¼ hðUIDjjxÞ
r0 ¼ Q P
S0 ¼ hðUIDjjr0Þ
a) The NCC checks if S0 = S. If they match the user is
authenticated. Otherwise, the authentication request is
rejected.
Step A2. Once the mobile user is authenticated, the NCC
chooses a secret random t to compute
V1 ¼ P t
V3 ¼ hðr0jjtÞ
Then, the NCC generates the new temporary identity
TIDnew to calculate V4 = V3 ¯ TIDnew and replaces TID with
TIDnew in the veriﬁcation table. The NCC computes
V2 = h(P||r
0||t||V4) .
Step A3. NCCﬁ U:V1, V2, V4
After receiving these messages, U computes
t0 ¼ V1  P0
V02 ¼ hðP0jjrjjt0jjV4Þ
U checks if V02 is the same as V2. If they are, then U
authenticates the NCC successfully. Then U computes
V03 ¼ hðrjjt0Þ
TIDnew ¼ V03  V4
U replaces TID with TIDnew in the user’s smart card and
computes the session key sk.
sk ¼ hðUIDjjrjjt0jjP0Þ
Pn
Figure 7 Improvement of CLC protocol.
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5.2. The data desynchronization attack on the Lee et al. protocol
From Fig. 6, it is evident that the Lee et al. Protocol cannot
resist the data desynchronization attack. The penetrator Pn
can intercept the message V1, V2, V4 from the NCC to the
LEO. Therefore the NCC has refreshed the temporary identity
TIDnew before U received the updated message.
5.3. Improvement of the Lee protocol
The NCC must store the old TID. If the replying message from
the NCC is lost. U will re-login and the NCC uses the old TID
of U. The desynchronization problem of the Lee protocol is
solved by extending NCC’s storage time for TID until U enters
the next authentication phase using the expected value TIDnew
which proves that U has successfully updated its secrets. Stor-
ing the value TID used in the previous authentication session
allows NCC to get the correct UID when U makes re-login.
So Fig. 6 should be modiﬁed into Fig. 7.
As shown in Fig. 7, two extra steps are added. After the
user U fails to receive V1, V2, V4 due to the effect of the pen-
etrator, he must re-login with a new Q and S as shown in step 5
(Fig. 7).
6. Performance and security analysis
The three presented protocols satisfy mutual authentication.
But in the case of jamming or data desynchronization attack
the mutual authentication will not be achieved. The improve-
ments to the three presented protocols make the mutual
authentication return after ﬁnishing of the jamming. So the
connection between the user U and the NCC will not be lost
forever. Two extra messages are needed for the presented three
protocols and storing of the previous authentication token is
required in the case of the CC’s protocol. In the case of the
CLC’s and Lee et al.’s protocols, storing of the previous user’s
identity is required.Pn
Figure 6 Data desynchronization attack on Lee protocol.7. Future study
Our paper makes a security analysis to authentication proto-
cols for mobile satellite communication systems. The paper
concentrates on special type of attack. It is a data desynchro-
nization attack. As a future work we can investigate further
attacks and try to give other suitable solutions to these other
types of attacks. In our paper, we used Strand Spaces veriﬁca-
tion tool, which is considered the most suitable veriﬁcation
method for data desynchronization attack. We can test the
other attacks using other formal analysis methods which are
more suitable to other types of attacks.
8. Conclusion
This paper discusses data desynchronization attacks on some
authentication protocol for mobile satellite communication
proposed in Chang and Chang (2005), Chen et al. (2009),
and Lee et al. (2012). In the strand spaces model, we found
that the three presented protocols were vulnerable to data
desynchronization attacks. In addition, improvements to over-
come the vulnerabilities of two protocols were given.
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